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According to specialists in American politics, the single most important factor
in determining the outcome of Presidential elections is the state of the economy.
A strong economy helps the incumbent party, and a weak economy helps the
challenging party. But in certain elections―1952 and 1968 are good
examples―foreign policy takes center stage. Foreign policy matters most when
the United States is engaged in controversial wars overseas. The Korean War in
1952 and the Vietnam War in 1968 moved foreign policy to the forefront of
presidential debate.
Once again, in 2008, foreign policy is a key electoral issue. The ongoing
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are of course on the minds of American voters and
candidates. But foreign policy matters in 2008 for a more fundamental reason:
Americans are debating not just military intervention, but the most appropriate
way for the United States to engage the rest of the world. The foreign policy of
the Bush administration, perhaps more so than any administration in recent
memory, has created considerable controversy at home and abroad.
A central concern has been the unilateral direction of U. S. foreign policy
under Bush. Unilateralism has upset many of America’ s closest friends,
particularly its European allies, some of whom offered significant opposition to
the U. S. intervention in Iraq in 2003. Unilateralism has also offended many
members of what might be called the Washington establishment of foreign policy
experts in and out of government in the United States. These experts believe that
the Bush administration has needlessly alienated other governments by adopting a
series of “go it alone” policies on the environment, in the Middle East, and on the
role of international institutions such as the United Nations.
A key question that many people have been asking, in the United States and
elsewhere, is whether American unilateralism will remain a typical feature of
U. S. foreign policy after the Bush administration. With the upcoming election of
a new American president, will we see a return to multilateralism in U. S. foreign
policy?
Many critics of the Bush administration in the Washington establishment and
in other capitals have a clear answer to that question. It is informed by what
might be called the “back to normal” view of American foreign policy. The back
to normal argument holds that ever since World War II, the United States has had
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a principled commitment to multilateralism in foreign policy. Multilateralism
was the defining postwar strategy, embraced by Democrats as well as
Republicans. The Bush administration has been the great exception; it made a
principled commitment to unilateralism and turned its back on the world, and the
consequences have been catastrophic both for American policy and for the
international reputation of the United States. Proponents of this view believe that
once the United States moves beyond the current President―and does not elect
another one like him―it can return to the multilateral path. It is not surprising
that the most ardent critics of Bush, and of the neoconservative coalition of
Republicans he empowered in foreign policy, believe that the safest solution for
returning the United States to normalcy is to elect a Democratic candidate.
Democratic candidates, of course, are responding to and reinforcing this
argument by campaigning against the Bush administration’s foreign policy and
promising a return to normal. In a Foreign Affairs essay, Barack Obama calls for
a renewal of American leadership: “American cannot meet the threats of this
century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America. We can neither
retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission. We must lead the world
by deed and by example.”
1
Not to be outdone, Obama’s Democratic opponent,
Hillary Clinton, also wrote in Foreign Affairs: “The tragedy of the last six years
is that the Bush Administration has squandered the respect, trust, and confidence
of even our closest allies and friends... At a moment in history when the world’s
most pressing problems require unprecedented cooperation, this administration
has unilaterally pursued policies that are widely disliked and distrusted... Yet, it
does not have to be this way... as President, I will seize the opportunity to
reintroduce America to the world.”
2
“Reintroduce” is a key word here. Democratic candidates have been telling
the Washington establishment and the broader international community that
America was multilateral in the past, it was taken in the wrong direction by Bush.
Once they are elected, America will move back in the proper multilateral
direction.
This is a well-intentioned story, and of course it has a happy ending. But I am
skeptical of it. I believe that the “back to normal” view gets the history of
American foreign policy wrong, and gets the Bush experience at least partly
wrong. It sets up too high an expectation for American foreign policy in the
future, an expectation that I suspect the United States can not and will not meet.
The United States has always been ambivalent about multilateralism. It will
continue to be ambivalent, no matter which candidate, from which party, is
elected president in November. If a Democrat is elected, the rhetoric surely will
change to place more emphasis on international cooperation and the virtues of
multilateralism in foreign policy. Some American policies will likely change as
well. But anyone who believes that once the Bush administration is gone,
America will somehow move quickly from unilateralism to multilateralism is
likely to be disappointed, for reasons having to do with both American power and
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American domestic politics.
This essay will make four points. First, I will explore briefly some of
historical reasons the United States has always been ambivalent about
multilateralism. There are also important intellectual traditions in American
foreign policy that are suspicious of international engagement in general and
multilateralism in particular.
Second, I will re-examine the post-World War II era. The United States did
embrace multilateralism―but more for pragmatic reasons than as a matter of
consistent principle. However American governments, both Republican and
Democratic, still resorted regularly to unilateralism when it suited U. S. interests.
The ‘golden age’ of multilateralism was not nearly as pure as many, looking back
from the current era, would like to believe. The United States both embraced and
defied multilateralism.
Third, we need to view the Bush experience in this proper historical context.
The Bush administration, particularly in its first term, clearly embraced a
rhetorical commitment to unilateralism, and it was unilateralism with an attitude,
with a western cowboy swagger. But in terms of policy, the Bush record is not as
unambiguously unilateral as many of its critics suggest. It is an exaggeration to
state that under Bush the United States has turned its back on the world. The
administration has maintained a commitment to multilateralism in many areas,
and overall there has been a good deal more continuity across American foreign
policy than the critics are ready to acknowledge.
Fourth, I will explain why it will be hard for next president―whomever he or
she is―to live up to a principled commitment to multilateralism. There are three
key factors―American domestic politics, America’ s extraordinary power
position, and existing American commitments―that will continue to make a
principled multilateral approach very difficult for U. S. foreign policy.
AMERICA’S HISTORICAL AMBIVALENCE
It is fair to say that the United States came into the world uncomfortable with
the world. In his farewell address to the new nation in 1796, the first American
President, George Washington, counseled his countrymen to avoid entangling
alliances and stated that it was the new country’ s policy to “steer clear of
permanent alliances with any part of the foreign world.” Washington’s view was
widely shared. The United States had broken away from an old world where
political power was centralized and exercised arbitrarily. The leaders of the new
nation wanted to disperse political power and they wanted to avoid the routine
wars and political controversies that characterized the day to day balance of
power politics of Europe. The new United States was blessed geographically; it
was separated from Europe (and from Asia) by large oceans, so it could afford not
to be involved in Europe’ s balance of power. As Washington noted, “Our
detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.”
3
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For most of nineteenth century the United States did pursue a different course.
It believed it had a “manifest destiny” or mission to expand westward, across the
North American continent. The United States did just that and by the end of the
nineteenth century became a great power. In the Spanish-American War of 1898
the United States drove Spain out of Cuba, occupied the Philippines, and
generally expanded its power into the Pacific.
But America was still ambivalent about multilateral engagement, and
remained detached from the European balance of power as much as possible.
Despite having material capabilities on the scale of a great power, the United
States tried to stay out of World War One into very late in the conflict. When it
did enter the war, on the side of Great Britain and France, President Woodrow
Wilson made clear to the American people that Britain and France were not allies,
but just “associated powers.” After the war, Wilson himself, in a fit of American
idealism, tried to engage the United States in an ambitious multilateral project to
restore European and international order. But the U. S. Congress, reflecting
America’s traditional ambivalence about multilateral engagement, rejected U. S.
participation in the League of Nations. Despite its formidable power, the United
States did not take an international leadership role in either the global economy or
the international political system during the interwar years. America only became
fully engaged in World War II at the end of 1941, and only after an attack on its
military facilities at Pearl Harbor.
The simple point is that the history of U. S. foreign policy did not begin in
1945. Prior to assuming a global role, the United States had a long history of
ambivalence about multilateral engagement.
Cultural and intellectual traditions reinforced that ambivalence. Wilsonian
internationalism―the intellectual tradition that underlies America’ s postwar
multilateral commitment―is not the only powerful tradition in American political
thought about foreign policy. Consider, for example, two other equally enduring
traditions.
4
What is often called the Jeffersonian tradition counsels the United States to be
minimally engaged internationally in order to protect democracy at home. The
logic of the Jeffersonian position is that an activist foreign policy, to be effective,
requires the centralization of power in the domestic political system. In the
United States, this has meant an expansion of the power of the President and his
close advisors at the expense of the other branches of government. So the more
active and engaged the United States is abroad, the more it risks democracy at
home. This was a great lesson drawn by many U. S. critics of the Vietnam War,
especially during Nixon years when the administration sought to stifle domestic
opposition to the war by harassing antiwar activists and monitoring ordinary
citizens suspected of being critical of the government’ s foreign policy. The
Jeffersonian tradition is alive and well today; some critics of the war on terrorism
worry that, in the attempt to make the United States more secure from outside
threats, the Executive, through measures such as the Patriot Act, is compromising
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American civil liberties at home. (Jefferson would say I told you so.) Some
realists critics of the Bush administration reflect Jeffersonian perspectives in
arguing that the United States today is sufficiently powerful that it should retreat
from permanent alliances in Europe and Asia and take up instead a strategy of
“offshore balancing.”
5
What has been called the Jacksonian tradition, for President Andrew Jackson,
emphasizes a set of traditional American values that do not always co-exist easily
with liberal multilateralism. The Jacksonian tradition is one of strong nationalism
that embraces the qualities of the rugged American individualist―self-reliance,
honor, and patriotism. The motto “don’t tread on me” and the corresponding
emblem of a rattlesnake on an early American flag, conveys, in foreign policy
terms, that idea that the United States wishes to be left alone, yet if provoked will
respond ferociously. Jacksonian thinking informs the western republicanism on
Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.
The point is not that Jacksonian thinking, or Jeffersonian thinking, are
necessarily dominant in contemporary U. S. foreign policy. The point is that
these traditions are alive and well and co-exist, sometimes uneasily, with the
liberal multilateralist tradition. The Wilsonian tradition of engagement and
multilateralism was central during the Cold War, but it is not the only U. S.
foreign policy tradition.
THE POSTWAR ERA AND CHANGE IN US FOREIGN POLICY
The end of World War II brought significant change to U. S. foreign policy.
The United States moved from a strategy of selective engagement to global
engagement. The major source of change was the onset of the Cold War, which
convinced American policy makers, by 1947, that containment of the Soviet
Union was the proper strategy. In light of the challenge of Communism,
containment had to be global in order to be effective. American policy makers
also felt that the United States was partly responsible for the catastrophes of the
interwar period―the great depression, the collapse of the world economy, and the
outbreak of World War II. The United States had become a global power, but had
turned its back on the world at a critical time, when the world needed U. S.
leadership. America had let the world down, and after the second major war the
United States was not going to make the same mistake again.
Multilateralism became a key instrument in the U. S. efforts to rebuild
international order and conduct the Cold War. First, the United States provided
support and inspiration for the United Nations. The UN was designed to facilitate
a concert of the great powers, but one more flexible and thus more realistic than
the failed League of Nations. Second, in Western Europe, the United States both
encouraged and was pulled into the enduring NATO alliance as the key
instrument of containment in Europe. Although NATO was precisely the kind of
permanent alliance that President Washington had long ago warned the United
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States to avoid, in the context of the Soviet challenge, a permanent transatlantic
alliance made strategic sense. The United States also promoted and supported
European multilateralism in the form of the nascent European Economic
Community. An integrated Europe would be easier for the United States to
defend, more capable of defending itself, and more likely to resolve the classic
internal European security problem, the Franco-German rivalry.
Third, multilateralism was America’s preferred strategy for the reconstruction
of the world economy. The interwar world economy, characterized by bilateral
deals, regional discrimination, competing economic blocs, and countries setting
their own exchange rates to get trade advantages over their neighbors, proved to
be destructive economically as well as politically. As Roosevelt’s Secretary of
State, Cordell Hull, liked to say, enemies in the marketplace eventually became
enemies on the battlefield. So U. S. policy makers discouraged regional
economic arrangements and promoted the multilateralism of the Bretton Woods
system with its supporting multilateral institutions, the GATT, IMF, and World
Bank.
Multilateralism gained great prominence in US foreign policy both in rhetoric
and in practice. And, because the United States was so powerful internationally,
multilateralism became embedded as a norm in international society as well.
Yet, it is important to recognize that for the United States, multilateralism was
always more a policy preference than a principled commitment. American policy
makers took a pragmatic approach to multilateralism. They preferred it as long as
it served U. S. interests, but were willing to dispense with it when it did not. The
United States favored whatever worked; multilateralism worked in Europe and in
world economy, but not in all aspects of foreign policy
In East Asia, the United States preferred bilateralism to multilateralism in its
security policy. It formed “hub and spoke” relationships with key allies such as
Japan, South Korea, and Australia. There was no meaningful, multilateral
equivalent to NATO in East Asia.
Similarly, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the United States placed little
or no emphasis on multilateral structures or institutions. Bilateral relations were
more important, with one controversial democratic partner (Israel), and several
non-democratic ones including Saudi Arabia and Iran at least until the collapse of
the Shah in 1979. Rather than multilateral engagement, the United States
adopted, until 1990, an offshore balancing strategy, seeking to assure that no
hostile state in the region became powerful enough to control oil supplies or
significantly threaten Israel.
In Latin America, the United States maintained the appearance of
multilateralism through its participation in and support of the Organization of
American States (OAS). But multilateralism here was more formality than
reality, as the United States continued its tradition of imperial control in what it
long considered its regional sphere of influence. U. S. officials, both Republican
and Democratic, supported anticommunist, authoritarian leaders such as Somoza
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in Nicaragua and Pinochet in Chile, opposed governments with communist or
even left leaning credentials such as that of Castro in Cuba and Allende in Chile,
and intervened militarily to make regime changes when it considered existing
governments to be hostile to American ideological or economic interests, such as
in Guatemala in 1954, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in Grenada in
1983.
Finally, the strong U. S. multilateral commitment to the United Nations never
materialized in the way American officials had hoped at the end of World War II.
The plan for a concert of great powers to lead the international system collectively
and multilaterally was shattered by the Cold War and subsequent division of the
world into competing blocs. The Cold War stalemate meant the UN could not
function, on the all-important questions of international security, as a meaningful
multilateral instrument. The United States during the Cold War simply used the
UN instrumentally, for example by obtaining UN Security Council support for the
U. S. -led intervention in the Korean War in 1950 when the Soviet Union and
China were not at the table. Over time, the value of the United Nations to
American diplomacy became more limited as new states joined the organization
out of the process of decolonization and used the UN General Assembly
politically against the United States for its support of Israel and its intervention in
the Vietnam War.
Thus, in overall terms, the multilateral “golden era” in U. S. foreign policy
was actually rather limited, applying primarily to U. S. relations with Western
Europe and to the U. S. approach to the world economy.
Even this limited commitment to multilateralism certainly did not preclude
American officials from acting unilaterally when they it to be necessary for
reasons of domestic politics or to maintain their preferred foreign policy
strategies. This resort to unilateralism, even during the so-called multilateral era,
was frequent, took place across Republican and Democratic administrations, and
applied to both security and economic issues.
Allow me to cite just a few examples. The long U. S. intervention in
Vietnam―much of it carried out by the Democratic Johnson administration―was
never a principled multilateral effort. The United States fought in Vietnam with
the support of what later would be called a “coalition of the willing,” against the
advice of some of its European allies at the start, and in the face of their
opposition as the war progressed. The Nixon shocks of 1971 are of course long
remembered in Japan. The Nixon administration brought an end to the
international monetary system of cooperation (the fixed exchange rate system,
with the U. S. dollar exchanged for gold) that the United States itself created, and
it did so abruptly and unilaterally, without even consulting its major allies. Nixon
also transformed the global foreign policy strategy of the United States with a
unilateral opening of relations with China―an opening the United States
undertook secretly and without consulting even its closest ally in the region,
Japan.
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Some people who consider the unilateralism of the Bush administration to be
unprecedented might be too young to remember the first term of the Reagan
administration. In the early 1980s, the United States defied its multilateral allies
and unilaterally abandoned the pursuit of arms control with the Soviet Union
despite an explicit NATO agreement (the “two track” decision of 1979) to pursue
it. In the Siberian gas pipeline conflict of 1982, the Reagan administration
refused to abide by the NATO consensus and imposed unilateral sanctions against
European companies for participating in economic cooperation with Soviet
Union.
Reagan also took a unilateral approach to the management of the U. S. dollar.
From 1981 to 1983, America’ s European allies begged for multilateral
coordination of exchange rates because the strong U. S. dollar was pulling
investment capital out of Europe and creating recession there as European central
banks raised interest rates to match U. S. rates. The United States refused to
cooperate, preferring to maintain the autonomy of its domestic economic policy
instead. It was only when the dollar became too strong, and began to threaten the
American economy, that the United States decided that once again it needed
multilateral cooperation. It forced its major allies, West Germany and Japan, into
cooperating in what became the multilateral Plaza Agreement of 1985 (which led
to the era of the strong yen in Japan). This is a clear example of America’s
pragmatic approach, which holds, in effect, that unilateralism is fine for the
United States, but that others need to be ready to cooperate if America decides
multilateralism is actually better.
The first Bush administration practiced unilateralism in international
economic policy. Its most dramatic initiative was the use of “Super 301” trade
negotiating authority, which called for the United States to act simultaneously as
prosecutor, judge and jury, deciding which countries were the world’s most unfair
traders and threatening punitive sanctions against them, all in the name of
promoting free trade. U. S. officials consistently argued that they preferred
multilateralism, but were also prepared to use bilateral talks, regional agreements,
and even unilateral threats and action if necessary to get what they wanted.
The critics of the current Bush administration who look back at the Clinton
administration as a high point of multilateral cooperation should reconsider.
During the early 1990s, Japan was the target of considerable bilateral pressure
from the United States, outside the GATT/WTO framework, to open its markets.
America’ s NATO allies tried for several years to convince the Clinton
administration to accept a multilateral approach to intervention in the Bosnian
civil war. The United States only agreed in 1995, and essentially dictated the
terms of military intervention in support of the Dayton Peace Accords. The
Clinton administration intervened under multilateral auspices in Somalia, but
pulled out unilaterally after taking casualties in a firefight with a recalcitrant
Somali warlord. The United States refused to intervene in Rwanda despite
international pressure to respond to genocide there.
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In Kosovo, the Clinton administration defied the UN Security Council when it
refused to support intervention, and worked instead through a different
multilateral entity, NATO. Similarly, in 1998 the Clinton administration
undertook Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign against Saddam Hussein’s
forces in Iraq. The administration bypassed the Security Council and refused to
accept limits on its ability to exercise U. S. military power. As Anthony Lake,
Clinton’s National Security Advisor, had stated earlier, “...only one overriding
factor can determine whether the United States should act multilaterally or
unilaterally, and that is America’s interests. We should act multilaterally where
doing so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally when that will
serve our purpose. The simple question in each case is this: What works best?”
6
If the Cold War was supposed to be the “golden age” of multilateralism, then
history tells a different story. The United States certainly had a rhetorical and in
some areas policy commitment to multilateralism. But its commitment was
neither principled nor consistent.
If the United States claims to prefer multilateralism, why does it resort so
frequently to unilateralism? One answer is that the United States accepts the
temptation to practice unilateralism because it believes it is powerful enough to
get away with it. As a great power, the United States fashions itself as a rule
maker, but also believes it has the right to be a privilege taker. American policy
makers often feel that because they assume the burdens of maintaining the
international system, they are somehow above the rules that constrain other, more
ordinary states. The rules that apply to other states in the international system do
not apply in the same way to an exceptional America. This attitude is clear in
financial policy, where United States runs massive current account deficits
without adjusting its domestic and foreign policies, because it believes that other
states will continue to hold dollars in their central banks. It is clear in discussions
of the international land mines treaty and the international criminal court, where
U. S. officials have contended that America’s global security role in a special
burden which brings with it the right for American military deployments and
personnel to be treated differently than those of other states.
Along these lines, U. S. officials have held the expectation that America’s
allies will remain faithful even when the United States is uncooperative. US
policy makers reserve the right to act unilaterally, but then they expect their allies
to fall in line behind them―or, at least to cooperate later on when the United
States is ready for its own reasons to return to multilateralism. We observed this
pattern in the cases of the Nixon shocks and Plaza Accord. It was also evident in
the 2003 Iraq war―the United States intervened without the support of some
major allies, but subsequently went back to its allies to request support as that
war, and the one in Afghanistan, have dragged on.
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IS THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION REALLY ALL THAT DIFFERENT?
With this historical context in mind, we can now examine the experience of
the current Bush administration. On the one hand, the charges of unilateralism
are very well founded. The Bush administration made a clear, public dismissal of
multilateral efforts such as the Kyoto accords, the land mines treaty, and the
International Criminal Court. It defied both the United Nations Security Council
and some of its major allies in NATO in initiating the Iraq war. In the case of
Afghanistan, NATO, in the spirit of multilateralism, initially invoked Article 5 of
the Treaty after the September 11 attacks, pledging its readiness to come to
defense of the United States. The Bush team expressed gratitude at this show of
alliance solidarity but chose, in its initial intervention in Afghanistan against the
Taliban, to do it essentially on its own.
On other hand, the Bush administration has not simply abandoned
multilateralism. On the world economy, Bush administration has been as
committed as prior U. S. administrations to multilateral approach to international
trade negotiations (e. g., the Doha round) and to US-led multilateral institutions
such as IMF and World Bank. In Asia, Bush has maintained bilateral alliances,
most importantly with Japan, but also shown preference for multilateral
approaches, most obviously in the case of the Six Party talks over North Korea.
Bush has promoted multilateral approaches to other security problems, such as the
Proliferation Security Inititative to address the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. And, despite the conflict over Iraq, during its second term the Bush
administration has returned to NATO as a multilateral entity, looking for help in
Afghanistan, support for a missile defense initiative, and a commitment to expand
NATO eastward, into the Balkans and parts of former Soviet Union such as
Ukraine and Georgia.
The Bush team is similar to past U. S. administrations in adopting a pragmatic
mix of unilateralism and multilaterism (as well as bilateralism) to satisfy U. S.
interests. So why is the Bush mix of unilateralism and multilateralism viewed so
differently, as being so much more unilateral?
One reason has to do with style and rhetoric. The Bush administration’s
practice of unilateralism is what Americans might call “in your face,” or without
apology. Some Bush administration officials have seemed eager to proceed
unilaterally, rather than viewing unilateral action as a reluctant step taken only as
a necessary last resort. By demanding to know whether other countries were “for
us or against us” in the war on terrorism, Bush administration officials were
essentially announcing that the United States would act as it saw fit, and other
either had to go along or be treated as part of the problem. A European friend of
mine explained the problem in this way: “Clinton acted unilaterally, but at least
gave the appearance of consulting, and taking the views of others seriously before
he did what he wanted! The Bush people do not even pretend to be listening to
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their allies―they simply inform us of what they expect us to do.”
Second, the Bush administration has created a lot of international anxiety
because it has preferred certain type of multilateralism―ad hoc coalitions of the
willing. Proponents of multilateralism both in the United States and abroad see
this as problematic because it seems to represent a move away from established
institutions like NATO or UN. Coalitions of the willing reflect a different
attitude about collaborative ventures; the United States decides the policy on its
own, and then works with whichever states are willing to go along. This is
different from believing that the United States is bound by multilateral institutions
that require compromise and cooperation as multiple players determine
collectively the proper course of action.
Third, during the Cold War U. S. policy makers often tried to suggest that
domestic politics should stop “at the water’s edge,” in other words, that American
foreign policy should not simply be a function of American domestic politics.
The Bush administration, however, has used unilateralism as part of its domestic
political strategy. Unilateralism, with its explicit defiance of liberal
internationalism, has appealed politically to some of the more extreme elements
of the Republican coalition. Its use has been a way to mobilize parts of the
Republican base by reinforcing the idea of the United States as a self-reliant
nation that is not constrained by big government at home or abroad. The proud
and public display of unilateralism has made it appear less as a pragmatic last
resort and more as a principled political strategy. Neoconservative interests
supported a more unilateral approach for domestic political reasons prior to
September 11
th
, but the tragedy on that day clearly facilitated its use. September
11
th
created an environment in which the most powerful state in the international
system became also a highly threatened one. The Bush administration perceived
it did not have the luxury to wait around for a multilateral consensus; it needed
instead to strike back at a time and place and in a manner of its own choice.
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
In the 2008 Presidential campaign the opposition Democrats clearly decided
to make the Bush foreign policy style and record a central issue. So it is sensible
to expect some changes if the Democrats win the election in November.
It is reasonable to expect a change in rhetoric. Barack Obama has made a
point repeatedly of promising a re-engagement of the United States with the
world. Obama has emphasized the importance of diplomacy, as a way to contrast
his proposed approach with what he believes has been the over reliance of the
Bush administration on the military instrument of statecraft. He claims he will
restore America’s international reputation and rebuild relations with America’s
friends. He has gone as far as to suggest he would open a dialogue with
American adversaries, including Iran. This is a promise of a new course in
foreign policy, and is also intended as a repudiation of the Bush administration’s
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“axis of evil” approach, which declares certain states to be unworthy of the
international community.
A Democratic President will want to back the renewed rhetoric of
multilateralism with deeds. So it is reasonable to expect some political initiatives,
including powerfully symbolic ones, to emphasize a new era of multilateralism.
One possibility would be for the next President to close down the U. S. detention
facility at Guantanamo, Cuba, as a way to repudiate the excesses of the war on
terrorism. Another strategy would be to initiate some type of multilateral
environmental initiative, as a way to amend for the U. S. defiance of the Kyoto
Accord. The idea will be to adopt policies that signal a break with the unilateral
past. Even the Republican candidate, John McCain, has sought to distance
himself from some of the foreign policy rhetoric and practice of the Bush years.
The United States is likely to adopt a more multilateral image in the years
ahead. But, anyone who expects a consistent, principled approach to
multilateralism is likely to be disappointed. Neither the Democrats nor the
Republicans are unlikely to practice the defiant unilateralism of the Bush
administration. But, following the traditional pattern, they are also unlikely to
usher in some type of golden age of principled multilateralism, for three important
reasons.
One has to do with domestic politics. American politics has become
polarized. With the Soviet threat gone, there is no longer a bipartisan foreign
policy consensus, as there was during the Cold War, to provide basic core
agreement on a set of foreign policy principles. Republican politicians have
played to their base, most strongly during Bush’ s first term, by defying
multilateralism publicly. But Democrats also play to their base, which includes
labor and environmental interests. The Democratic base is increasingly skeptical
of the benefits of multilateral free trade policies. Both Clinton and Obama
attacked NAFTA during the presidential primary campaign. Democrats in
Congress have denied the President what used to be called fast track trade
authorization―in other words, the President no longer has the discretion to
negotiate trade agreements, bilateral or multilateral, and submit them to Congress
for an up or down vote. Even if we treat some of the free trade bashing of the
Democratic primary as political rhetoric, it will be difficult for any Democratic
President to defy labor and environmental coalitions and push for progress in
complicated multilateral trade negotiations that necessarily require the United
States to make compromises and sacrifices in the interest of completing a deal.
The fact that the United States may be entering a period of economic crisis
and slower growth will make it all the more difficult for the next administration to
foster multilateral trade deals that require the United States to accept further
market opening arrangements at home.
Second, the next administration will inherit the commitments of the last one,
whether it likes it or not. The war in Iraq and war on terrorism are key examples
here. Much of the rest of the world associates them with unilateral America. But
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they will be hard for America to abandon. Regardless of their campaign
promises, Democrats in power will not have to luxury simply to pull the United
States out of Iraq. They will worry, as the current administration does, about
whether leaving will create a bigger mess―not to mention a geopolitical victory
for Iran―than staying and trying to muddle though. The risk for Democrats
should they win the Presidency is that the unilateral Iraq war will become their
war, just as Vietnam became the Republicans’ war when Nixon inherited the
Presidency from Johnson.
The war on terrorism has become an entrenched American security priority
even if Democrats are critical of the manner in which the Bush administration has
conducted it. The next President will likely have to maintain this foreign policy
priority even if other countries think the United States is exaggerating the threat.
A second attack on U. S. soil would create renewed pressures for any US
administration to deal with terrorism regardless of whether other countries are
willing to go along.
U. S. policy towards Russia also holds the potential for renewed unilateralism.
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in summer 2008 rekindled fears of a return to the
Cold War. As in the past, the inclination of America’s European allies is to
engage rather than confront Russia. U. S. officials, particularly if the Republicans
are re-elected, may be more inclined toward containment and confrontation.
Third, and finally, regardless of which candidate is elected, the United States
will remain an extraordinarily powerful country that perceives itself as both
necessary to preserve world order and privileged to act ‘above’ world rules if
necessary. It was a Democratic Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who
immodestly proclaimed the United States to be the world’ s “indispensable”
country. Although there may be differences in rhetoric and style, Democrats as
well as Republicans are accustomed to acting in what they consider to be
America’s best interests first, and then expecting others to fall into line.
The next administration will have good incentives in the short term to
embrace multilateralism. But the world should not expect America’ s
commitment to be either consistent or principled. Rather than expect or hope that
the next administration will be different, the sensible strategy for other countries
is to find ways to adjust to the fact that the United States is as comfortable acting
unilaterally as it is working multilaterally with its economic and security partners.
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